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Allocation to Groups: Examples of Lord’s Paradox
Daniel B. Wright
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
AbstractBackground. Educational and developmental psychologists often examine
how groups change over time. Two analytic procedures–ANCOVA and
the gain score model–each seem well suited for the simplest situation,
with just two groups and two time points. They can produce different
results, what is known as Lord’s paradox.
Aims. Several factors should influence a researcher’s analytic choice. This
includes whether the score from the initial time influences how people
are assigned to groups. Examples are shown which will help to explain
this to researchers and students, and are of educational relevance. It
is shown that a common method used to measure school effectiveness
is biased against schools that serve students from groups that are his-
torically poor performing.
Methods & Results. The examples come from sports and measuring edu-
cational effectiveness (e.g., for teachers or schools). A simulation study
shows that if the covariate influences group allocation, the ANCOVA
is preferred, but otherwise the gain score model may be appropriate.
Regression towards the mean is used to account for these findings.
Conclusions. Analysts should consider the relationship between the covari-
ate and group allocation when deciding upon their analytic method.
Because the influence of the covariate on group allocation may be com-
plex, the appropriate method may be complex. Because the influence
of the covariate on group allocation may be unknown, the choice of
method may require several assumptions.
Keywords: Lord’s paradox, value-added models, ANCOVA, educator equity
A common situation in educational and developmental psychology is measuring mul-
tiple groups of people at multiple time points with the goal of trying to understand how
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these groups differ over time. This is a complex situation and not surprisingly there are
numerous analytic choices. But even its simplest form, two groups at two time points,
presents a difficult statistical choice. Lord (1967, 1969) examined two plausible methods of
analysis. He used the context of university student weight by gender, with the time points
being the beginning and ending of the academic year. The first method is subtracting the
initial weight from the prior weight (i.e., how much weight the student lost or gained) and
doing a t-test on these differences.1 This is called the gain score approach.
An alternative is conducting an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on the final weights
using the prior weights as a covariate. Because these can lead to different conclusions Lord
called it a paradox, and it fits within a class of paradoxes applicable when comparing
relationships among three variables (Pearl, 2014; Wainer & Brown, 2007).
In this section the gain score and ANCOVA procedures will be briefly described, as
well as some extensions to them. The case considered is where there are two groups and two
time points. This is for explanatory ease. Both the number of groups and the number of
time points can be increased. Increasing these would increase the complexity of the models,
but not the fundamental issue considered here.
The gain score model involves subtracting the time 1 scores (following Rubin [1977]
called PreTesti) from the time 2 scores (called PostTesti), and then performing analyses
on these gain scores with a t-test. This tests the null hypothesis of β1 = 0 in the following
equation:
gaini = PostTesti − PreTesti = β0 + β1 groupi + ei . (1)
This can be re-written as a regression predicting PostTesti:
PostTesti = β0 + β1 groupi + 1 · PreTesti + ei . (2)
Two important assumptions for the gain score model are that PostTesti and PretTesti are
on the same scale so that PostTesti − PreTesti makes sense and that this difference has
the same meaning for all values of PreTesti. While in some cases it may be plausible to
transform the data to meet these assumptions, sometimes this is not plausible.
The second procedure is ANCOVA:
PostTesti = β0 + β1 groupi + β2 PreTesti + ei . (3)
Sometimes an interaction is included; sometimes it is not included. Here it will not be
included and β1 therefore estimates an average group effect after conditioning on PreTesti.
The difference between eqns. 2 and 3 is that for the gain score approach β2 is fixed at 1 and
for the ANCOVA it is estimated.
Here I refer to “gain score” for any model where the variable predicted is the difference
between the final scores and previous scores. The word “ANCOVA” is used for several
different types of models (Cox & McCullagh, 1982). Here it is used for any model where
the previous scores are conditioned upon. The conditioning might be linear like eqn. 3
or a complex function, like the monotonic splines that are part of the Student Growth
Percentile (SGP) models (e.g., Betebenner, 2009) used in many US states to measure student
1An alternative that allows this to be extended to more complex problems is to have a 2 × 2 mixed
ANOVA. The interaction between time of the test and group is the same effect as tested by this simpler
gain score t-test. The simpler test will be used here.
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growth (for more discussion of this approach see, for example, Lockwood & Castellano, 2015;
Wright, 2018). Here linearity is assumed. A related model is where covariates are used to
match people with similar scores on a set of covariates. One approach to this is called
propensity matching (Rosenbaum, 2002). Matching is related to ANCOVA and is discussed
later in this paper.
There are several other extensions to the basic gain score and ANCOVA models. One
particularly relevant extension for education is that both of these approaches can be used
to describe multilevel models where the students are nested within classrooms and schools
(e.g., Aitkin & Longford, 1986; Goldstein, 2014). Later in this paper multilevel versions
of gain score and ANCOVA models are used for measuring school effectiveness. This is of
much importance in education as many school systems have implemented accountability
measures (Muller, 2018). For a historical overview of this approach in the UK see Leckie
& Goldstein (2017). The method used in this example is similar to those used in many
US states (Amrein-Beardsley, 2014). Therefore it is worth briefly describing the multilevel
versions of the gain score and ANCOVA approaches.
Let j refer to the different schools and i to the different students. A simple multilevel
gain score model would be:
PostTestij = β0 + 1 · PreTestij + uj + eij , (4)
where the uj allows for variation around the intercept β0. The corresponding multilevel
ANCOVA is:
PostTestij = β0j + β1PreTestij + uj + eij . (5)
An estimate for uj for each school can be calculated from these models. One ap-
proach is to estimate the conditional modes. The conditional mode for the jth school is
the most likely value, given the model, for this school’s effectiveness. These are sometimes
called school residuals (e.g., Goldstein et al., 1993, p. 428). This approach is sometimes
called the value-added model or VAM, though the name is perhaps presumptuous given the
debate about what these procedures measure (e.g. American Statistical Association, 2014;
Goldstein, 1991; Wright, 2017). The complexity of this procedure has lead to many policy
makers to accept over-simplistic explanations and to believe that it accurately measures
value-added (Braun, 2013).
Regression Towards the Mean
There was a problem with Darwin’s theory of evolution. Consider human height. If
parents had children whose height naturally varied around the parents’ height, and these
children had their own children and their height varied in the same way, the variance in
a population would increase every generation. Galton collected data showing this did not
happen. The variance remained fairly constant across generations and Galton realized that
this was a problem for Darwin’s theory. Two very tall parents’ offspring will likely be taller
than the population average but, on average, not as tall as themselves. This observation has
become known as regression towards the mean (RTM). Stigler (2016, Ch. 5) describes how
Galton went from proposing a clever (but unnecessary and incorrect) biological mechanism
to account for the inter-generational homogeneity of variance, to realizing RTM occurred
more generally and therefore its cause was a statistical artefact.
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RTM can be explained using the central equation of psychometrics:
Observed Score = True Score + Error . (6)
Assume the True Score and Error are independent. It is expected that those with high
Observed Scores are likely to have above average True Scores and are likely to have above
average Errors. If a second score is observed, and nothing has been done to change the
True Score, it is expected that this True Score will still be above average, but the expected
value of Error is zero. The expected value will be centered on the True Score, which will
tend to be between the original observed value and the population mean. Therefore, the
expected value will regress from the original observed value towards the mean of the group.
Following Efron & Morris (1977), a baseball example will be used to illustrate how
RTM can affect the estimates. Baseball is a good source of data to illustrate statistical
concepts because there is much information on each individual player (Marchi & Albert,
2013). Baseball is popular in North and Central America, Japan, Korea, and its popularity
is growing elsewhere. Further, the confrontation between the pitcher and batter, relevant to
the current example, is similar to the one between the bowler and batter in cricket. Enough
information is provided in this paper so that the example should be clear to readers not
familiar with baseball or cricket. The example is about batting averages. A baseball batting
average is, roughly, the proportion of times that the player successfully hits the ball and
reaches a base safely (the calculation is slightly more complicated), so high scores are better.
Averages are reported to three decimal points, e.g., .247 for 24.7% successful. Efron &Morris
took 18 players’ batting averages from the first few games of the 1970 season and predicted
how well they would hit for the remainder of the season. They showed that the players’
averages tended to regress towards the mean of the 18 players. Here we will consider RMT
when there are two groups.
Baseball players are either pitchers or position players (occasionally a player is both–
what is called an all-rounder in cricket–but this is rare enough in baseball to ignore for
current purposes). The pitchers are on the team for their defensive (non-batting) skills
and therefore tend to have low batting averages: around .150, meaning they are successful
about 15% of the time. The position players are chosen because they are good hitters. Their
average is about .260, meaning they succeed about 26% of the time. RTM works within
these groups, so a pitcher or position player hitting far above or below their groups’ average
in the first half of the season is likely to regress towards their group mean in the second half
of the season. Data from the 2016 season (accessed 30 Oct., 2016, from mlb.mlb.com and
the R data file at https://github.com/dbrookswr/VAM-Work/total.Rdata) are shown in
Figure 1. The gain scores tended to be lower for players who had high first half averages
that those who had low first half averages (the slopes of the regression lines are negative).
Lord’s first statistician would calculate the gain score for each player and then de-
pending on assumptions might conduct a t-test. Welch’s version of the t-test is used here
because the standard deviation for pitchers is higher than for position players because pitch-
ers’ averages are based on fewer at-bats (other methods could also be used to account for
this heteroscedasticity). The mean gain score for the pitchers is: mean gain = .023 and the
position players is: mean loss = -.005. The result is: t(65.493) = 1.95, p = .055. Depending
on the α level and if a one- or two-tailed tests are being used (two-tailed is used here),
the analyst may declare this is a non-significant result (btw, the p-value if using Student’s
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Figure 1 . Scatter plots showing, both for pitchers (Panel A) and for position players (Panel
B), that those who hit above their group means in the first half (to the right of the vertical
dashed lines) tended to have lower second half averages (below the horizontal dashed lines).
The opposite is true for those initially hitting below their group mean. The regression lines
are in solid.
rather than Welch’s method is: p = .013).
Lord’s second statistician would conduct an ANCOVA on the second half average,
conditioning on the first half average, and look at the coefficient for whether the player is
a pitcher or a position player. The finding is a detriment for pitchers of: -.064, or one hit
about every 15 at-bats. The residuals are more dispersed for pitchers than the position
players so robust standard errors were calculated. The HC1 standard errors from the
estimatr package (Blair et al., 2019), based on the procedure described by MacKinnon &
White (1985), were used. The difference is statistically significant: t(173) = -3.95, p < .001.
Conditioning on first half averages, position players hit higher than pitchers for their second
half averages. Sports researchers could probably come up with clever reasons why this may
occur, but this difference can be accounted for by regression towards the group mean so
requires no further explanation beyond this statistical artefact. The position players are
regressing towards a higher mean than the pitchers are regressing towards. Wainer (2000,
see also Wainer & Brown, 2007) called this regressing towards different means Kelley’s
paradox, for the influential psychometrician Truman Kelley.2
2They used the word paradox because of the context in which they were studying this. There was the
belief that if universities enrolled students with good test scores from schools with low average scores, that
when removed from these low-average environments that the students would excel compared with students
with similar scores from schools with high averages. When they looked at the data they found the opposite
occurred; students regressed towards the mean of the group, and for some this seemed paradoxical. While
reasons exists for why these groups may go up or down in comparison with the other (and likely in some
contexts these occur), it is important first to account for this regression artefact.
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What happens for matching procedures? Methods like propensity matching (Rosen-
baum, 2002) are popular. They allow researchers to match on one set of variables, and
then compare some outcomes by other variables. Suppose pitchers and position players are
matched on first half averages for the 2016 season. One pairing in this data set could be
pitcher Gerrit Cole, who hit .208 in the first half, and position player Yasmani Grandal,
who hit .212 in the first half. This average is high for a pitcher, but low for a position
player. Therefore, the prediction is that Cole’s average will decrease in the second half
and Grandal’s average will increase in the second half. Two players with similar first half
averages are expected to have different second half averages if they are from different groups
and nothing else is known about them. Consistent with these predictions, in the second half
Cole’s average decreased to .188 and Grandal’s increased to .245. Matching works similar
to ANCOVA in this context.
Consider a different sporting example where the appropriate statistical procedure is
different. The US magazine Sports Illustrated (www.si.com) puts an athlete who performs
really well in recent events on its cover. Here, cover athletes are considered a group. There
is something call the Sports Illustrated jinx where the cover athletes tend to perform worse
after being on the cover than before, compared with other athletes (see en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Sports_Illustrated_cover_jinx, accessed 1 Dec., 2018). Here the gain score
approach is inappropriate because the athletes are selected to be on the cover based on their
performance. The expectation is that these athletes will regress a bit towards the level of all
athletes. The key difference between these examples, discussed more in the next section, is
whether the covariate (first half average or performance in recent events) influences which
group (pitchers or cover athletes) a person is in. If group membership is not influenced by
the covariate the tendency is to regress towards that group’s mean.
It is worth making clear that statistical artifacts, like RTM, do not preclude other
effects. But before speculating on additional or alternative explanations, it is worth ruling
out statistical artifacts. For example, in education there is much discussion about Matthew
effects (e.g., Stanovich, 1986) or the rich get richer. Evidence for this is increased variance
over time (so the type of increase Galton did not observe with inter-generational human
height). However, if a researcher used an ANCOVA to predict wealth at time 2, conditioning
on wealth at time 1, to show that groups that tend to be rich (higher time 1 values) get even
richer at time 2, at least part of this effect could be accounted for by RMT and therefore
should be considered prior to hypothesizing some additional mechanism.
Lord’s Paradox and Group Allocation
Since Lord (1967) dangled this apparent paradox in front of researchers, numerous
authors have taken up the challenge to explain this paradox. Commentators agree that
the two analytic approaches are both accurate descriptions of the data (and other possibil-
ities exist), but address different research questions (e.g., Hand, 1994; Wainer, 1991). The
gain score approach is “an unconditional comparison between the gains of the two groups”
(Hand, 1994, p. 324) while the ANCOVA “is a test of an average conditional comparisons,
conditioning on initial weight” (Hand, 1994, p. 324). Thus, either can be an accurate de-
scription, but of different quantities. Wainer (1991) asks how this relates to making causal
inference about the group. This is the focus here. If trying to decide whether some variable
is causally efficacious in the absence of random allocation it may be that only one approach
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Figure 2 . Panel (A) shows the graph based on Lord’s original formulation, with Program
influencing PreTest and PostTest. In Panel (B) the direction of causality is now from
PreTest to Program. These are based of Figures 2b and 5 of Pearl (2016) and Table 1 of
Rubin (1977).
will provide unbiased estimates (and it may not be either of these). The remainder of this
section will focus on approaches that show which approach is more suitable depending on
the causal relationship between the initial score (weight at the beginning of the year in
Lord’s case) and the grouping variable (gender in Lord’s case).
Figure 2 shows graphical models of two situations where both gain score and ANCOVA
procedures might be considered.3 The figure is adapted from Pearl (2016) and the situations
correspond to the examples in §7 of Rubin (1977). Using Rubin’s variable names, there are
PreTest and PostTest scores and a variable for whether the student was in a computer-
aided learning program or the regular program. Panel A corresponds to Lord’s (1967)
original formulation where the group variable is exogenous to the system. In Lord’s original
formulation the weights did not affect gender (similar to how in the baseball example first
half averages do not [usually] affect a player’s position). In Panel B the PreTest scores
influence which group the student was in. Rubin states that just looking at the data (in his
Table 1) it is not possible to know which of these panels is the appropriate causal model
and therefore which statistical procedure is appropriate. He describes how assumptions are
often necessary to make causal inference.
Several researchers have shown that which of these panels is more appropriate informs
whether the gain score or ANCOVA model is more appropriate. Holland & Rubin (1983)
use Rubin’s potential outcomes model for causation (for review of this model, see Holland,
1986). For Panel A, each approach is applicable if different untestable assumptions are made
(Holland & Rubin, 1983, Table 1.2). The need to make assumptions about how some aspects
of the data arise in order to reach conclusions about other aspects is nicely summarized by
Cartwright’s motto: “no causes in, no causes out” (Cartwright, 2014, p. 312). For the gain
score model the assumption is that without any group effects the expected value for the
PostTest is the PreTest (Holland & Rubin, 1983, eqn. 3.7).
3There is a specific mathematical sense of the word “graph” as a set of nodes, some of which are connected
by edges. This is an important area of mathematics and for making causal inference in science (Pearl, 2009).
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In Panel B group membership is influenced by the initial scores. Holland & Rubin
(1983, pp. 21–22) describe this situation in §A.4 of their appendix and show (assuming
linearity and parallel slopes for the groups) that the ANCOVA approach yields appropriate
estimates. Pearl (2016) uses graphical models and reaches a similar conclusion: in Panel
A both approaches can be correct depending on the research question and assumptions,
but for Panel B “one [statistician] was right (ANCOVA) and one [statistician] was wrong.”
Wright (2006) reached similar conclusions, but using simulation methods. When the group
is not influenced by the covariate, and the assumptions for gain score model in Holland &
Rubin (1983) hold, the gain score approach provides unbiased estimates and ANCOVA does
not. The converse is true when the covariate influences group membership.
An alternative way of conceptualizing this is whether to expect regression towards
the group means, as with Panel A of Figure 2, or regression towards the mean for the whole
sample, as with Panel B. The distinction is whether group membership is dependent on
the covariate. In Panel A the group exists without the measurement of that covariate. In
the baseball example the players are pitchers or position players without having to have a
first half batting average. In Panel A, students opt for the experimental program without
being influenced by their marks on the PreTest. However, membership of the group, Sports
Illustrated cover athletes, is due to their recent performance. The group would not exist
without excellent recent performances. Similarly in Panel B of Figure 2, the group exists
because of the measurement. In these cases the group distinction can be thought of as
just recoding the covariate. As such, people will tend to regress towards the overall sample
mean.
Measuring Educational Equity
The purpose of this section is to show how the choice of statistical model–using
covariance or gain scores–is relevant to a controversial topic in education: measuring school
effectiveness. This was chosen because of the its importance in education. It is a complex
example and therefore illustrates how Lord’s paradox and regression towards the mean can
be applied to important real-world problems.
In education, many jurisdictions estimate the effectiveness of schools and teachers
using student test scores. These estimates can have serious consequences including school
closures, loss of employment for teachers, and have enticed educators to change student test
answers (Blinder, 2015). Use of these to measure educational equity is the focus here, but
policy makers should be cautious in general using this approach (e.g., American Statistical
Association, 2014; Goldstein, 1991; Wright, 2017).
Achievement gaps in education refer the differences between scores for historically low
performing groups (e.g., those from low socio-economic status [SES] groups) and scores for
historically high performing groups. In the US Chief State School Officers are required to
submit their plans for how they will try to lessen these gaps (see www2.ed.gov/programs/
titleiparta/resources.html, accessed Dec. 1, 2018). One reason given for achievement
gaps is that some analyses show that historically low performing groups of students are
more likely to be enrolled in less effective schools than other groups of students. This
is called the educator equity gap. For example, New Mexico’s 2015 report finds minority
students and economically disadvantaged students attend schools that the state rates as less
effective than other schools (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/equitable/
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nmequityplan060115.pdf, accessed Dec. 1, 2018). The argument is that if states can ensure
equal access to quality schools, then the achievement gaps should shrink. This is a laudable
aim, and programs that provide incentives for good teachers to work in less effective schools
are encouraged. The goal here is to explore if the educator equity gaps are being measured
appropriately. The method used is based on the method used in New Mexico for rating
schools prior to 2019.
How jurisdictions measure effectiveness vary, but many include measures based on
student test scores often using ANCOVA or ANCOVA-like procedures (like the VAM and
SGP methods discussed earlier). The statistical question is in which situations does the
VAM (eqn. 5) or the multilevel gain score model (eqn. 4) perform better than the other.
The results of Holland & Rubin (1983), Pearl (2016), and Wright (2006) reinforce the notion
that: “knowledge of the assignment process is critical to drawing inferences about the effect
of the treatments” (Rubin, 1977, p. 22). A simulation will be conducted to show how the
way in which students are assigned to schools should affect the choice of statistical method.
Simulation Methods
Two different data models are used for the simulation. Figure 3A shows how most US
public K–12 education districts operate. There is variability in socio-economic status (SES)
by region and achievement gaps associated with these variations. These influence where stu-
dents usually go to school (though in some locations there is limited parent choice) and the
PreTest and PostTest scores. The school impacts the PostTest, but not the PreTest scores
(the PreTest being “pre” the schools’ influence). Figure 3B is appropriate if the covariate
(here PreTest scores) has a causal influence on which school the student attends. This is
appropriate for some universities and some selective primary and secondary schools (e.g., if
using ACT scores both for admissions and as a covariate in the model). It is also applicable
for teacher evaluation within schools where students may be streamed into a class based
on previous performance (Paufler & Amrein-Beardsley, 2014). This is important because
sometimes these methods are used to estimate teacher effectiveness (Amrein-Beardsley,
2014).
The simple data models in Figure 3 are used to focus on the importance of knowing
how students are assigned to schools. It is important to stress that these are simple models.
If the statistical models exhibit problems with these simple data models, it will allow the
cause of the problems to be more easily identified than if complex (more realistic) models
were used. In applied settings other variables will impact each of these variables and it is
likely that for some schools the covariate causally impacts which school the student attends,
but not for others. Appropriate statistical models should take these aspects into account.
An advantage of using simulation methods is that the researcher knows the true values
of all variables. Here the critical variable–the direct effect of schools on students’ scores–
is unobserved with empirical data, but it is known in simulations. The primary question
here is whether these scores differ between groups of schools. This would suggest educator
inequity. With simulations, data sets can be constructed where it is known whether there
is a difference between the true effectiveness between schools that serve predominantly
historically low performing groups of students and those serving predominantly historically
high performing groups of students. An additional second advantage of simulations is
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Figure 3 . The causal models used to create data for the simulation. The node Re-
gion/SES/Achievement stands for these three associated variables. In Panel A these directly
influence which school the student attends (in K–12 situations usually based on region). In
Panel B school attendance is influenced by PreTest (e.g., a university could use ACT or ‘A’
level scores as part of their admissions process, and this could be conditioned upon in the
analyses).
that the procedure can be repeated thousands of times to provide precise estimates of the
procedure’s performance.
The simulation has a 2×2 design. The first factor is whether the data are constructed
according to Figure 3A or 3B. The second is whether there is no difference in the true
effectiveness of schools serving historically high and low performing groups of students or
a difference of .2 of the standard deviation in the true variability of school effectiveness.
Cohen (1988) calls this a “small” difference, though in this context it would be considered
substantial. Lipsey et al. (2012) discuss how to interpret effect sizes in different educational
contexts (see also Baguley, 2009). While some educators search for extremely large effects
(e.g., Bloom, 1984, talked about searching for effects ten times larger than this), Chetty
and colleagues (2011) show how much smaller effects can produce large outcomes when
they persist over time. This factor allows both Type I and Type II errors to be examined.
The R code for this simulation is at the end of this document and is available at https://
github.com/dbrookswr/VAM-Work/2020LordSimul.r.
For each replication, the sample is divided into two equally sized groups (e.g., these
might be those above and below the median on household income, or different ethnicities).
There is a latent variable, called Achieve, for individual differences among students that
influence test scores. The latent variable for both groups is normally distributed, but the
means for the higher performing group is .2σ higher (Cohen’s small effect). The PreTest
scores are based on this variable and normally distributed random error. Within each group,
Achieve and the random error have the same standard deviation. Half the schools are la-
belled high and half labelled low for which types of students they tend to serve (historically
high or low performing groups of students). For Figure 3A, students from the historically
high performing group have an 80% probability of being assigned to an upper school and
students from the historically low performing group have an 80% probability of being as-
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signed to a lower school. For Figure 3B, students who score above the median on PreTest
have an 80% probability of being assigned to a upper school and those who score below the
median have an 80% probability of being assigned to a lower school.
The true school effects are all drawn from normal distributions. For the no difference
conditions, the true effectiveness scores for all schools are drawn from a distribution with
a mean of zero; there are no systematic differences in effectiveness between the two sets
of schools. For the “small” difference conditions, the high and low schools’ effectiveness
scores are drawn from normal distributions, but the mean for high schools is .2σ greater
than the mean for the low schools. The PostTest scores are based on Achieve, the true
school value-added, and random error. These data are created to adhere to some common
statistical assumptions so that lack of fit cannot be attributed to, for example, skewness of
effectiveness scores. There were 2,000 replications for each condition so the standard errors
are small. There are assumed 500 schools each with 100 students.
The VAM (eqn. 5) and the multilevel gain score (eqn. 4) are used to estimate ef-
fectiveness (other statistical models were also in the simulation and are available from the
author). The conditional modes are calculated and used to estimate the effectiveness for
the individual schools.
Simulation Results
Table 1 shows the mean effectiveness scores for the two groups of schools, and the
differences, in each of the four conditions of the 2×2 design and for the two statistical models.
Starting with the data models from Figure 3A with no true differences between groups (first
column), the VAM (multilevel ANCOVA) estimates that the schools that predominantly
serve historically high performing students are more effective (Type I errors). Of these
estimates, 1756 of the 2000 (88%) were in this direction, and of these 439 (25%) were
statistically significant at α = 5%. Only 2 of the 242 (0.83%) estimates in the other direction
were statistically significant. The gain score model correctly shows no overall bias. There
were 962 (48.1%) trials showing an advantage for schools serving predominantly groups of
historically high performing students and 1038 (51.9%) in the opposite direction. These are
not significantly different from 50% (p = .094). In total 102 of these (5.1%) were statistical
significant, which is not statistically significantly different from the nominal level of 5%
(p = .878). In the next column, where there is a true effect to detect, both models show
100% statistically significant differences in the correct direction.
The final two columns of Table 1 correspond to when students are allocated into
the two groups of schools on the basis of the covariate (Figure 3B). The VAM (multilevel
ANCOVA) correctly estimates that there is no group bias (column 3). Nine-hundred and
ninety-three estimates (49.65%) were in the direction of favoring schools serving predomi-
nantly high performing students and 1007 (50.35%) in the opposite direction. This is not
statistically significantly different from 50% (p = .771). Overall 86 of these (4.30%) were
statistical significant, which is not statistically significantly different from the nominal level
of 5% (p = .166). The gain score model estimated statistically significant effects, for all
trials, with an advantage for those schools serving mostly historically low performing groups
of students. The fourth column shows when there is an effect. The two models give 100%
statistically significant estimates, but in opposite directions. The VAM correctly shows
the advantage for schools serving predominantly groups of historically high performing stu-
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Table 1
The mean effectiveness values for data created for Figure 3A or Figure 3B, and whether
there was no difference or a small difference between the effectiveness of the two categories
of schools (high = historically high performing; low = historically low performing).
Figure 3A Figure 3B
Statistical Model Group No diff .2σ diff No diff .2σ diff
VAM (multilevel ANCOVA) high 0.24 2.37 0.00 1.99
postij = β0 + uj + β1 preij + eij low -0.24 -2.37 -0.00 -1.99
diff 0.47 4.74 0.00 3.98
Multilevel gain score high -0.01 4.12 -6.11 -1.53
postij = β0 + uj + preij + eij low 0.00 -0.01 6.10 5.86
diff -0.01 4.13 -12.21 -7.40
Note: Standard errors are approximately .01.
dents. The gain score estimates that those schools are less effective. Finding an effect in
the opposite direction of the true effect is what Gelman & Carlin (2014) call a Type S error,
for an error in the sign of the effect.
Simulation Discussion
The VAM (multilevel ANCOVA) provided biased results when school allocation was
based on Figure 3A, when the PreTest did not causally influence which school the student
attended. This is because student scores regressed to their group means. This is analogous
to how the pitchers and position players each regressed towards their group means in the
second half of the baseball season. Because ANCOVA, in some sense, compare students
with similar initial scores, this means this statistical artefact will lead the VAM to estimate
schools that serve mostly high-performing students to be more effective than those that
serve mostly lower-performing students. The schools that serve groups that predominantly
historically high achieving will appear more effective even when there are no true differences
(column 1 of Table 1). The gain score model performs better in this situation, though
caution is urged using the gain score model for this purpose. These data were created to
be consistent with the assumptions Holland & Rubin (1983) list for this model. Before
implementing a gain score model in any situation it is important to address whether the
scores on the two tests are comparable so that their differences make sense to compare.
The VAM (ANCOVA) procedure performed better than the gain score model when
school allocation was based on Figure 3B. The gain score model provides biased estimates
here because students regress to the overall sample mean. This is analogous to the Sports
Illustrated jinx discussed above. The fourth column shows when there is an effect. The
ANCOVA correctly shows the effect. The gain score estimates that those schools serving
low performing students do better: the opposite direction of the true effect.
This is an important conclusion for places using these types of models for estimating
school (and teacher) effectiveness. Analysts should consider whether the covariates, usually
some set of prior test scores, can influence the schools students attend. Wright (2017)
argues that those using these methods for high-stakes decisions should construct multiple
causal models of how they believe the data may arise, simulate data using these models,
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and examine the accuracy of their statistical methods. This would allow them to show their
assumptions and demonstrate the performance of their analytic method.
The substantive conclusion is that because most K–12 school allocation is not based
on the covariate in these models, that the ANCOVAmethods (including VAM, SGP, propen-
sity matching, etc.) are likely to yield biased estimates and should not be used in these
situations. These will often show large educator equity effects (e.g., the New Mexico findings
discussed above), but as shown here at least part of these effects are a statistical artefact.
General Discussion
For over fifty years Lord’s (1967; 1969) paradox has been used to illustrate how the
choice of statistical methods is not simple, even when there are only three variables. Part of
the reason for this is that when asked what ANCOVA does statisticians sometimes give the
misleading short-hand response that “it controls for the covariates” and that it somehow
allows causal inference for the other variables. This advice is given despite methodologists
describing the many limitations of the procedure for decades (e.g., Meehl, 1970). The result
is that many non-statisticians come to believe that the procedure does more than it actually
does. With reference to educational effectiveness, Braun (2013) describes how some policy
makers attribute almost magical power to these methods.
Several authors (e.g., Holland & Rubin, 1983; Pearl, 2016; Wright, 2006) discuss that
it is important to consider whether the PreTest scores influence the grouping variable. These
authors use of mathematical, graphical, and simulation methods, and their texts will appear
quite technical to many readers. It is hoped that choosing a sports example and presenting
limited mathematical details that the concepts underlying regression towards the mean are
clear. The critical consideration is whether group allocation is determined by the covariate
or just associated with it. The mechanism to explain the different outcomes is regression
to the group mean, if the group membership was not influenced by the initial score.
The examples and simulations describe situations where a single covariate either does
or does not have a causal impact on group membership. In some real world situations there
will be multiple covariates some of which may have a causal influence, some not, and some
may have an influence only on group membership for some in the sample. To complicate
matters further, the researcher may not know which variables influence group membership
and for whom. If the researcher is unsure, several different simulations can be conducted in
order to evaluate how sensitive the different statistical methods are to whichever aspects of
the model that the researcher is uncertain about. This can create a very complex situation.
It is hoped that this paper helps researchers to take steps towards these types of situations.
Further, it is important to show how the choice of statistical models can have impor-
tant policy implications. There is much debate about using test scores to evaluate schools
and teachers (e.g., Amrein-Beardsley, 2014; Foley & Goldstein, 2012). This is why this
particular example was chosen. It is important to consider the causal models underlying
the data before deciding how to analyse them. Examining these clearly shows when the
statistical method often used is inappropriate.
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Appendix
R Code for the simulations
The function used to run the simulation is below. It allows the user to choose the
number of replications, the number of schools and students, which of the two graphs in
Figure 3 to use, the probability that students are assigned to their group’s school, and
the name of a data file to create. The code is also available at/: https://github.com/
dbrookswr/VAM-Work/2020LordSimul.r. Readers are encouraged to adapt the code for
their own needs and contact the author with any questions or comments.
makedata <- function(reps=1000,nschool=500,nstud=50000,
dag=1,ratio=.8,name="sim",writeit=FALSE){
effvals <- matrix(nrow=reps,ncol = 1+2*5)
pvals <- matrix(nrow=reps,ncol = 1+2)
dirvals <- matrix(nrow=reps,ncol = 1+2)
#during revision so just for a couple of models
dirvals[,1] <- pvals[,1] <- effvals[,1] <- rep(c(0,5),each=reps/2)
for (x in 1:reps){
StudGr <- rbinom(nstud,1,.5)
Achieve <- rnorm(nstud,-2+StudGr*2,sd=20)
pre <- Achieve + rnorm(nstud,sd=20)
PreGr <- as.numeric(pre > median(pre))
school <- vector(length=nstud)
SchGr <- rep(0:1,each=nschool/2)
ifelse(dag==1,
StSchGr <- rbinom(nstud,1,ratio*StudGr+(1-ratio)*(1-StudGr)),
StSchGr <- rbinom(nstud,1,ratio*PreGr+(1-ratio)*(1-PreGr)))
school[StSchGr == 0] <-
sample(1:(nschool/2),sum(StSchGr==0),replace=TRUE)
school[StSchGr == 1] <-
sample((nschool/2 + 1):nschool,sum(StSchGr==1),replace=TRUE)
seff <- rnorm(nschool,sd=5) + effvals[x,1] * SchGr*1
SchData <- cbind(1:nschool,seff,SchGr)
colnames(SchData) <- c("school","TrueVA","SchGr")
StudData <- cbind(StudGr,Achieve,pre,school,StSchGr)
Sim1Data <- merge(StudData,SchData,by="school",all.x=TRUE)
Sim1Data$post <- Sim1Data$Achieve + rnorm(nstud,sd=20) +
Sim1Data$TrueVA
AvePrex <- aggregate(Sim1Data$pre,by=list(Sim1Data$school),mean)
colnames(AvePrex) <- c("school","AvePre")
Sim1 <- merge(Sim1Data,AvePrex,by="school",all.x=TRUE)
m1 <- unlist(ranef(lmer(post~1+(1|school),data=Sim1)))
effvals[x,2:3] <- tapply(m1,SchGr,mean)
m2 <- unlist(ranef(lmer(post~pre+(1|school),data=Sim1)))
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pvals[x,2] <- t.test(m2~SchGr)$p.value
dirvals[x,2] <- t.test(m2~SchGr)$statistic > 0
effvals[x,4:5] <- tapply(m2,SchGr,mean)
m3 <- unlist(ranef(lmer(post~pre+AvePre +
(1|school),data=Sim1)))
effvals[x,6:7] <- tapply(m3,SchGr,mean)
m4 <- unlist(ranef(lmer(post~pre+StSchGr +
(1|school),data=Sim1)))
effvals[x,8:9] <- tapply(m4,SchGr,mean)
m5 <- unlist(ranef(lmer(post - pre ~ 0 +
(1|school),data=Sim1)))
pvals[x,3] <- t.test(m5~SchGr)$p.value
dirvals[x,3] <- t.test(m5~SchGr)$statistic > 0
effvals[x,10:11] <- tapply(m5,SchGr,mean)
}
if(writeit) write.csv(effvals,paste0("ef",name,".csv"),row.names=FALSE)
if(writeit) write.csv(pvals,paste0("pv",name,".csv"),row.names=FALSE)
if(writeit) write.csv(dirvals,paste0("dir",name,".csv"),row.names=FALSE)
return(list(effvals=effvals,pvals=pvals,dirvals=dirvals))}
The following code runs the two simulations.
set.seed(3812)
effvals1A <- makedata(writeit=TRUE,name="standard",reps=4000)
set.seed(7913)
effvals2A <- makedata(writeit=TRUE,name="selection",dag=2,reps=4000)
